By Dr. Roddy Tempest
Since the devastating events of Sept. 11, America has become extremely aware of its vulnerabilities regarding both the detection and response to terrorist events within its borders. The World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks provided a glimpse at what could happen in the event of a terrorist assault. The public reaction to the anthrax cases in October, November, and December 2001 is further evidence of the psychological power of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons.
For governments, institutions and major corporate entities, success in dealing with both preparedness and response to CBRN events has become of utmost importance. A key issue becomes the availability of safe, potable drinking water for users of facilities and for the survivors and responders during and after such events.
Our reservoirs are safe — they hold millions and millions of gallons of water, which would significantly dilute any contaminant. And a terrorist would have to release enormous amounts into the source to do any serious damage — anyway, most contaminants would be removed when the water was purified at a treatment plant. Furthermore, our reservoirs are often well protected and our water-treatment plants are usually heavily guarded.
However, there's no question that the distribution system is our most vulnerable spot. According to the well respected Jane's Information Group's Chem-Bio Handbook, "The contamination of an individual water supply, such as water just before it enters a specific building, represents the most feasible approach provided an appropriate biological agent is employed."
If there's an intentional attempt to create a backflow, there is no way to completely prevent it. A backflow attack could spread highly concentrated amounts of poison to a few thousand homes or businesses, making a terrorist's attack far more effective. Government buildings, embassies, corporate headquarters, and military facilities are unprotected from direct CBRN attack. In fact, such "icon" facilities obtain their water directly from municipal water systems and are subject to the risk of a direct attack.
Many of these facilities have back-up plans that depend on using tanker trucks as their only contingent water supply source. The problem with this standard response plan to "truck water to the facility" is that (1) the facility may have the same contaminated water as the source available for the tanker trucks, (2) the tanker trucks may have difficulty reaching the facilities, because the roads may be inaccessible; and (3) most significantly, should the tanker trucks get to the facilities with potable water, there is no standardized means for transferring the water from the trucks and integrating it into the facilities' infrastructure and distribution system, assuming that the distribution system has not been contaminated itself.
In addition, many of these "icon" facilities may themselves be the target of a CBRN event. The vulnerability of such facilities to direct attack was highlighted in a recent Wall Street Journal article on December 27, 2001, which revealed that a significant risk to individual facilities is the targeting of the water supplies of those facilities. The feasibility of such a targeted attack had been clearly demonstrated. For example, CBRN contaminants could be introduced into a specific facility merely by filling a bathtub in an adjacent facility with water, introducing the contaminant into that small amount of water, and with the use of a hand pump, back flush the contaminant into the local distribution system, thereby contaminating the water system upstream of the target building.
It is exactly this vulnerability that will continue to drive demand for new solutions in technology for potable water supply in our communities. This ensures a robust market for providers of water and wastewater technologies for years to come. The member companies of WWEMA stand ready to meet these challenges in partnership with our utility clients. WW/
About the author: Dr. Roddy Tempest is a member of the Board of Directors of WWEMA and is Chairman and C.E.O. of Tempest Environmental Systems, based in Durham, NC. He has more than 25 years of experience in the environmental field and international business arena, with a masters in Business Administration and doctorate degrees from the University of North Carolina and Duke University in International Law, and Civil / Environmental Engineering. Dr. Tempest is also Chairman of the Water Subcommittee on the U.S. Government's Environmental Technologies Trade Advisory Committee (ETTAC) and has been nominated for the prestigious U.S. National Medal of Technology for 2002 in the Environmental Technologies sector.
