To Reduce Water Utility Remote Access Cyber Risk, Make the Secure Path Faster Than the Workaround

When the secure remote access path is slower than the workaround, the workaround wins, and that gap is where most water sector utilities are exposed to risk.

Key Highlights

  • See how attackers reached water systems in at least 12 states with nothing elaborate, and the plain fix the FBI and EPA recommend.
  • Walk through how a vendor gets into one pump controller with a quick approval, a logged session, and access that closes on its own.
  • Understand how making the secure path the fastest path ends the need for workarounds like shared passwords, so a small team can get back to its other jobs.

By Ben Burke, President, Dispel

When the secure remote access path is slower than the workaround, the workaround wins, and that gap is where most water sector utilities are exposed to risk.

It's a Saturday morning at a lift station, and the level alarm is climbing. The operator on shift, one person covering water quality, distribution, and whatever else comes up that day, calls the integrator who installed the pump controls six years ago. The integrator connects the way they always have: a cellular modem and a remote desktop session, credentials the utility has never actually seen, since the integrator set the whole thing up themselves and it's worked fine ever since. The pump restarts. The alarm clears. Nobody logs what happened, because there's nowhere to log it.

Nothing about that story is unusual, and that's the problem. It's a composite of how a lot of remote access into water systems works today, and it's the same gap behind this year's incidents.

The pattern behind this year's cyber incidents

Over 48 hours in late July, more than 30 Minnesota community water systems were hit in what officials called a coordinated attack. By August, utilities in at least 12 states had been affected. The FBI and EPA's advisory described nothing elaborate. After reaching internet-facing controllers remotely, the attackers changed IP addresses and passwords, and operators lost monitoring and control. Effects included loss of pressure and flooding.

Two details in that advisory will sound familiar to anyone who has called an integrator on a weekend. It flagged the cellular modems used for remote field access, and warned that third-party network setups can look alike across customers, letting an attacker repeat one success many times.

Its recommended fix is just as plain. Take controllers off the open internet, use strong, unique passwords, and route every connection through a secure gateway that brokers it.

None of this is incompetence. It's capacity. EPA reported in 2024 that more than 70 percent of inspected systems weren't fully meeting basic Safe Drinking Water Act requirements. GAO told Congress in May that utilities face workforce shortages, aging equipment, and budgets where clean-water rules may crowd out cybersecurity.

The workaround was never negligence. It was the fastest option available.

Nobody chose that remote desktop session because it was secure. They chose it because it was fast, and with an alarm climbing, fast is the only criterion that matters to the person on shift. A workaround doesn't win because people are careless. It wins because the sanctioned alternative, if there is one, takes longer. If a line goes down, the person who can fix it is somewhere else, and someone shares their password. The password isn't the failure. It's a symptom of a secure path that was slower than the workaround it was supposed to prevent.

Why the legacy stack can't fix this on its own

A traditional VPN, still common in water systems, doesn't solve the problem it's assumed to solve. It puts a remote user on the network, where a trusted engineer and a compromised laptop look the same. One login is often shared across a vendor's whole team, nothing records what anyone touched, and a legitimate session looks the same as a stolen one until something has gone wrong. A standing jump host adds a second fixed target with the same weakness. Neither answers who this is, what they can reach, and for how long.

Modern secure remote access answers the question a VPN can't

Modern OT secure remote access doesn't put a person on the network at all. It brokers a session to a specific asset, for a specific purpose, for a window of time that closes on its own, and ties every session to a named individual instead of a shared credential. It's the same principle behind the FBI and EPA's advice to broker every connection, built so the audit question of who did what and when answers itself.

The difference shows up where the lift station story broke down. A vendor requests access to one pump controller, not the network it sits on. A supervisor approves it from a phone in under a minute. The session is logged as it happens, and when the work is done the access is gone, because it was never designed to outlast the task. Many small utilities shy away from enterprise cybersecurity platforms because they lack the budget and full security team those platforms assume. Dispel's right-sized version is built for the team they have, so existing staff can deploy it, often within a day, with no network redesign.

Making the secure path the fastest one

Let’s go back to that Saturday morning. The alarm is climbing and the operator still has forty other things to do. With OT secure remote access, the fast way and the secure way are the same path, so nobody has to choose between getting the pump running and knowing exactly who touched it and when.

It closes the other door too. The controllers hit across a dozen states were reachable, standing, and unwatched. A model that brokers a single session to a single asset for a defined window leaves no such pathway to find. No always-on connection. No shared credential to guess or steal. No session that outlives its task. The same design that gets the integrator in fast leaves a threat actor with nothing to find if they come looking.

The communities that can least afford a cyberattack are too often the most exposed to one. Dispel launched its Community Power & Water Program in September to close that gap. It brings the secure remote access large utilities rely on to small water and electric utilities, deployable by existing staff without an infrastructure overhaul, with special pricing for approved applicants. Details at go.dispel.com/dispel-community-power-water-program.

That's the measure of whether a security model works for this sector. Not how sophisticated it is, but whether the person with forty-five jobs can use the secure path without it becoming the forty-sixth, and whether the door that's fast for them is the same door that's closed to everyone else.

 

About the Author

Ben Burke is President and COO of Dispel, which builds Zero Trust secure remote access for operational technology environments. He is a contributing author on several NIST publications and served as a group lead on NATO’s Zero Trust advisory group. Learn more about Dispel at dispel.com.

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